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H I G H L I G H T S
• Industrial demand-side flexibility holds unique potentials for system stability.• Hereby, it may be an engine for sustainable and inclusive industrial development.• We illustrate guidelines of a corresponding flexibility transition pathway.• We develop a first monitoring approach for a country’s flexibility transition.• Our monitoring approach indicates mis-developments and needed countermeasures.
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A B S T R A C T
In many countries, industry is one of the largest consumers of electricity. Given the special importance of
electricity for industry, a reliable electricity supply is a basic prerequisite for further industrial development and
associated economic growth. As countries worldwide transition to a low-carbon economy (in particular, by the
development of renewable energy sources), the increasing fluctuation in renewable energy production requires
new flexibility options within the electricity system in order to guarantee security of supply. It is advanced in this
paper that such a flexibility transition with an active participation of industry in general has unique potential: It
will not only promote green industrial development, but also become an engine for inclusive industrial devel-
opment and growth as well as delivering a just transition to a low-carbon economy. Given the high potential of
industrial demand-side flexibility, a first monitoring approach for such a flexibility transition is illustrated,
which bases on a flexibility index. Our flexibility index allows for an indication of mis-developments and sup-
ports an appropriate implementation of countermeasures together with relevant stakeholders. Hence, it holds
various insights for both policy-makers and practice with respect to how industrial demand-side flexibility can
ensure advances towards an inclusive, just, and sustainable industrial development.
1. Introduction
Electricity is a key input for various production processes in all in-
dustrial sectors. In most developed countries, industry accounts for
around 50 percent of total electricity consumption, which highlights the
importance of electricity in general. With electricity being a crucial
economic commodity, electricity systems with a stable and secure
supply are a fundamental precondition for the proper and efficient
functioning of the industrial sector – both in developed and in
developing countries – and also to meet wider societal needs [1,2].
Being a driver for further industrial development and growth, appro-
priately designed electricity systems have therefore become a key suc-
cess factor for industrialization and therefore also for the overall eco-
nomic growth of a nation [3].
In the past, centralized electricity systems with a few large con-
ventional power plants provided industry and society with its electricity
where demand and supply were managed accordingly. Then, gradually
more liberalized electricity systems evolved [4]. With the onset of the
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growth of low-carbon electricity generating infrastructure, more pro-
duction from renewable energy sources (RES) is currently observed.
This development has been further supported with several global cli-
mate initiatives, such as the Paris Agreement 2015, where many
countries have decided to speed up their energy transition towards a
sustainable, low-carbon economy [5]. Complementary to the increase
of RES, conventional plants are to be decommissioned step by step. This
holds not only for Germany that decided to phase out its nuclear power
plants by 2022 and plans to shut down its coal-fired power stations by
2038 at the latest, but also for many other countries around the world.
However, an increasing share of RES will directly lead to a typically
decentralized and highly intermittent electricity supply structure, as the
sun does not always shine, and the wind does not always blow [6].
Ultimately, this calls for an incorporation of new and more cellular
flexibility options to close the arising flexibility gap [7,8].
In this context, flexibility relates to the ability to address short-run
and unexpected imbalances between demand and supply [9]. New
flexibility may come from various sources that will have to be exploited
over the next years, e.g., through new storage technologies, increased
sectoral coupling, industrial demand-side management (DSM), or im-
provements in operational efficiency through technological develop-
ment [7,10]. There is a growing literature around flexibility and it has
focused, e.g., on renewable energy [11,12] or localized electricity grid
options [13,14] – more is detailed on this in Sections 2 and 3.
While reliable and financeable electricity systems will form the basis
for a successful industrialization in general, at the same time the on-
going energy transition has the unique potential to foster a sustainable
industrial development. In this respect, energy resources may be used in a
sustainable way without future generations being harmed by the ex-
cessive exploitation of the limited natural resources [15]. Thus, pros-
perity and growth associated with further industrialization can reduce
associated negative impacts on our environment.
In order to develop such a sustainable industrial development, the
energy transition pathways that are chosen need to ensure that flex-
ibility becomes an option through which the different industrial sectors
of a country can actively play their role in the electricity system [16].
Otherwise, due to insufficient flexibility, future energy systems may still
have to rely on harmful conventional backup generation facilities as a
source of stability and plannability. In this context, especially industrial
demand-side management (DSM) may allow for a better adjustment of
intermittent supply of renewables and demand [17,18]. Here, industrial
demand-side flexibility relates to all measures that allow to shift de-
mand over time and space in order to better address fluctuations in
renewable energy production [19,20].
In particular, the energy transition must in an inclusive way make
sure that no one is left behind, i.e., that there is a ‘just’ transition to a
low-carbon economy. In a world with growing cross-border energy
supply chains (e.g., the continued EU efforts to develop the internal EU
electricity market), such an inclusion does obviously also apply to
countries. Hereby, this article – as well as expanding the literature on
flexibility and energy – reflects and is in line with the concept of
‘flexibility justice’ as was stated recently in the journal Nature Energy
[21]. Among others, flexibility justice aims to have a flexible and dy-
namic energy sector where the market-place is open to all stakeholders,
and as a result a market can take advantage of the (flexibility) tech-
nologies that are available. Against this background, the goal is to also
allow new players to enter the energy market including completely new
flexibility suppliers. Ultimately, this may require a change of existing
market and policy structures that must keep pace with the current
worldwide developments.
In the case where the new system requirements described above
associated with a further development of RES, individual flexibility
potentials of industry, and an equitable distribution of future gains and
costs are appropriately taken into account by energy policy, such an
inclusive and just flexibility transition may ultimately serve as a powerful
engine for inclusive industrial development without detrimental effects
on economic growth; see Fig. 1. Thus, tackling climate change, both,
sustainability and inclusiveness, must be addressed in order to ensure a
development of the overall economy that drives long-term growth and
prosperity for everyone – i.e., in essence meets the demands of the
energy trilemma [22]. Here, this is developing a low-carbon economy,
but achieveing this through a fair and equitable process, i.e., a just
transition, and encouraging active participation with respect to the
supply of flexibility of the industry is the key focus of this paper [23]. In
Fig. 1 below, it is demonstrated how the flexibility transition will
support society to move from today’s energy system to one that is low-
Fig. 1. Highlighting the relevance of a flexibility transition, a sustainable and inclusive industrial development, and a just transition towards a low-carbon economy.
A joint transformation is needed in all three dimensions: within the energy system, within the industry, and within the economy itself.
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carbon based and where key characteristics will be industrial flexibility
and justice.
Our research proposes that a first approach supporting the design
and especially the monitoring of the flexibility transition in the industry
is utilized by countries. The latter approach may allow an indication of
mis-developments and support an appropriate implementation of
countermeasures together with the relevant stakeholders in order to
keep moving forward on the path towards an inclusive and sustainable
industrial development in times of green energy. There is significant
literature on examining how concepts of justice (utilizing the term
energy justice) can benefit the energy sector and therefore society [15].
Against this background, we advance a practical application of how
industry can improve its performance in meeting energy and climate
goals that would see a just transition to a low-carbon economy. As is
noted in Section 4.3, governments begin to introduce new law and
policy in this area and our focus on resolving flexibility in the electricity
system for industry would have highly relevant real world research
application on this issue as well as making an advance on just transition
and energy justice literature. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to highlight the important role of industrial demand-side flexibility
as a key element of a just energy transition and industrial development.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 highlights the im-
portance of a well-functioning electricity system for industrial devel-
opment and growth, where particularly the high interdependence be-
tween the electricity sector and the other sectors of an economy are
elaborated on; Section 3 focuses on the need for flexibility in modern
electricity systems, while in Section 4 we highlight the potential of the
‘industrial flexibility transition’ to become an engine for sustainable and
inclusive industrialization, and an overall just transition to a low-
carbon economy. In the penultimate section (Section 5), the originality
of the article is presented with a first approach for the challenging
monitoring of such a flexibility transition of the industry; and finally,
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Electricity, industrial development, and economic growth
Prevailing literature states a positive correlation of electricity con-
sumption and economic growth all over the world in both, developed
and developing countries [1,2,24]. Hereby, electricity empowers almost
every process in the industry. For example, in 2016 in Germany in-
dustry accounted for around 47% percent of net electricity consumption
[25]. Based on the United Nation’s International Standard Industrial
Classification of all Economic Activities [26], by ‘industry’ we refer not
only to the manufacturing sector, but also to sectors such as agriculture,
forestry, and fishing; transportation and storage; or information and
communication. Given the high electricity dependency of industry,
electricity supply security is a pre-condition for a smooth and well-
functioning of industry processes in the short-run (and obviously for a
well-functioning economy in the short-to-medium and even long-run).
In particular, not only the availability of an absolute amount of energy,
but rather a reliable, uninterrupted, and constant electricity supply is
an important prerequisite for the successful operation of many industry
processes [2]. Against this background, industries such as aluminum
production even need 100% security of supply for their sensitive pro-
duction processes that rely on electrolysis, which is not a given in many
industrialized countries in Europe [27].
A key problem is the coincidence of several electricity supply in-
terruptions together with a slow restoration of electricity supply
through corresponding control options of the grid operator, which can
be very costly and harmful for companies. During such an electricity-
supply interruption, shortages of electricity may deteriorate product
quality, increase waste, reduce or irreversibly destroy product output
(e.g., if the temperature of the production process falls below a certain
limit value due to an oven failure), and damage machines together with
Fig. 2. Cascading effects of a local electricity supply shortage at a disrupted firm f (black circle). The forward propagation is indicated by grey circles and solid
arrows, while the corresponding backward propagation is described by grey rectangles and dashed arrows.
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a possibly increased danger for workers; see [28,29]. However, pro-
duction may not only be negatively affected during an electricity supply
interruption, but also hours, days, and even weeks after such an event.
In particular, during the company’s transition phase to a normal op-
eration of its production processes there may be severe economic losses
in terms of additional maintenance work, missing production with
possible short-time work, as well as existential forgone profits that can
reach into the millions.
From a supply chain perspective, interruptions at individual sup-
pliers may have a negative impact on companies that rely on the cor-
responding input in subsequent stages of the supply chain (forward
propagation) as well as on suppliers of the interrupted company itself
(backward propagation). Especially in times of increased (inter-) na-
tional interconnection with just-in-time production and reduced in-
ventory levels, local electricity-supply interruptions may rapidly spread
within supply chains and even yield supply bottlenecks for end products
[30]. Fig. 2 below illustrates how such a disruption at a given company
may (1) negatively affect subsequent companies in the supply chain
that heavily rely on the disrupted company’s input as well as (2) the
corresponding backwards propagations to the disrupted company’s own
suppliers during the company’s restoration phase as described above.
Such spreads of local electricity supply shortages are commonly re-
ferred to as cascading effects [31].
A developed and reliable electricity infrastructure is therefore a
major part of the long-term basis for strengthening a country's eco-
nomic location through well-functioning production processes and
competitive cost levels [3]. Valuable investment incentives in new
factories or machines may be created by a reliable electricity system,
which may then directly attract potential investors. In turn, newly in-
vested production plants may yield new jobs. If the newly hired workers
then spend their salaries on goods, new jobs in the industry will directly
have further positive effects on overall economic growth and may
create even more jobs in other sectors. On the opposite, insufficient
electricity infrastructure may directly yield the long-term threat of a
slowdown in further industrialization and reduced growth rates of a
country. Table 1 below summarizes corresponding negative economic
effects of an unreliable electricity supply.
Notwithstanding the high importance of electricity for the (manu-
facturing) industry, electricity does not only satisfy needs of large in-
dustrial consumers, but is also one of the foundations of modern life in
both developed and developing countries. Reliable and financeable
electricity systems, for instance, ensure the operation of hospitals, care
facilities, and educational institutions (from kindergartens to uni-
versities). Electricity is also a key ingredient for the mobility sector and
contributes to agricultural advances including, e.g., innovative irriga-
tion systems. On an individual level, electricity therefore allows for the
satisfaction of human and societal needs [32,33] – and for many across
the world energy access is a significant problem which future electricity
systems based on RES and corresponding flexibility would resolve to
some degree (see also the following sections for more details).
Ultimately, reliable electricity supply can raise everyone's standard of
living and contribute to social participation, inclusion, and equality. For
the sake of a better overview, Table 2 briefly illustrates the electricity
dependency of selected sectors of an economy.
Again, from a macroeconomic point of view, a sufficient supply with
electricity does not only allow for a satisfaction of social or economic
needs. Rather, if sufficiently supplied with electricity, a very wide range
of non-industrial sectors may have the potential to further contribute to
economic growth: For instance, educational institutions may raise
knowledge and skills of (future) workers and employees, hospitals may
contribute to a higher general life expectancy, and increased social
security may yield a positive investment climate for foreign investors.
Thus, a secure electricity supply is not only important for social reasons,
but it can also be another central pillar for economic growth in addition
to the industry itself.
3. The need for flexibility in future energy systems
3.1. From conventional generation flexibility to new sources of flexibility
The sections above illustrate the high dependency of a country on
electricity and underlying electricity systems. Historically grown, in the
past electricity systems were designed to adapt the timing of electricity
feed-in to the demand patterns of mainly inflexible consumers. This
inelasticity of demand implied that consumers based their electricity
demand exclusively on their needs and did not respond, e.g., to elec-
tricity prices and corresponding temporal changes in the supply of
electricity. The supply side, on the other hand, was designed as to
flexibly compensate for variations in demand by either starting-up or
shutting down flexible power plants, often at short notice. Therefore, in
conventional energy systems, the supply side provided the necessary
flexibility to ensure system stability. In this context, the term flexibility
describes the general ability to address short-run changes and im-
balances between electricity supply and demand [19,34].
Any electricity system must be able to deal with both uncertainty
and variability on the demand and supply side [35]. However, with a
further development of weather-dependent, intermittent RES such as
photovoltaics (PV) or wind and a corresponding replacement of con-
ventional bulk generation like nuclear or coal, it will become increas-
ingly challenging to flexibly adapt electricity supply to inelastic de-
mand [8,36,37]: Whereas the generation of conventional power plants
could be actively controlled in the traditional electricity system, due to
their generation patterns, RES are hardly controllable by humans. Ul-
timately, the energy transition has fundamentally transformed tradi-
tional electricity systems.
In addition, as compared to centralized bulk power plants, RES are
much more distributed across the countryside and smaller in terms of
their generation capacity [6,38]. As a result, RES do not necessarily
feed in electricity evenly across a country. For example, due to general
meteorological differences between parts of Germany, the majority of
Table 1
Possible barriers to further industrialization and negative economic effects of an insufficient and unreliable electricity infrastructure. Effects on industrial companies
and other players such as staff are highlighted.
Effects on industrial companies directly affected by a supply
interruption
Effects on other players such as staff or companies in the supply
chain
Effects during an electricity supply
interruption
• Loss of production• Reduced product quality• Increased waste• Damage to machines
• Increased danger for workers• Impact on safety in operations and associated wider effects
Effects after an electricity supply interruption • Additional maintenance work• Missing production• Reduced profits• Loss of customers• General strain on company performance• Loss of reputation
• Bottlenecks in the supply chain• Reduced working hours for workers• Increasing prices for end customers• Negative impact on consumer welfare and therefore overall
economic growth
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the country’s PV systems (as well as the industrial centers) are located
in the south, while most wind turbines are located in the north of
Germany close to the sea or off-shore [39]. Similar differences can also
be found in many other countries. In modern electricity systems, such a
spatial separation puts enormous stress on a country’s existing grid
infrastructure, which was originally designed in and for a world in
which power plants were located close to consumption centers [20,38].
As a consequence, what is needed in future energy systems are new
sources of temporal and spatial flexibility [7,19]. While temporal
flexibility aims at better adopting electricity demand to supply, e.g.,
shifting demand inter-temporally, spatial flexibility is needed to trans-
port electricity from locations where energy is supplied to locations
where energy is consumed, cf. for example, the ongoing discussion
about the construction of several high-voltage DC transmission lines
between Germany’s wind-intensive north and the energy-demanding
south [40].
Research knows several options to increase the flexibility of a
system [7,8,41], for example: (1) supply-side flexibility; (2) storage
flexibility; (3) transmission flexibility, i.e., grid expansion; (4) demand-
side flexibility; and (5) inter-sectoral flexibility. The goal of all five
flexibility options is to reduce the flexibility gap, i.e., the increasing
imbalance between flexibility provided and flexibility needed [7]. Al-
though an in-depth analysis of the different flexibility options is not the
focus of this paper, the five options are briefly described in the fol-
lowing.
Flexibility option 1: Supply-side flexibility. This flexibility option refers
to the modification of the electricity output of power plants to align
power supply with demand. Due to their inherent start-up or ramping
characteristics, peaking or load-following power generation units such
as gas and hydro power plants allow system operators to quickly re-
spond to changes in demand within seconds to minutes. RES may also
provide supply-side flexibility, e.g., through curtailment [35]. The most
significant benefit of supply-side flexibility is that the costs for pro-
viding flexibility are comparatively low as the flexibility that is already
inherent in existing assets can be exploited. A major challenge with this
flexibility option is, however, that as conventional power plants are
increasingly replaced by RES, the flexibility provided by the supply-side
will decrease. Curtailment of RES may not be able to compensate for
this decrease, as it is only a one-sided measure that also involves losing
some of the generated electricity, which in turn is costly [35].
Flexibility option 2: Storage flexibility. This flexibility option allows to
shift the supply of power through time, thereby balancing temporal
mismatches between supply and demand [42]. In particular, batteries
charge power in times where supply from power plants is abundant and
discharge power in times where power supply is scarce [35,43]. A
major benefit of storage flexibility is that it also allows for seasonal
shifting of electricity. However, an exemplary challenge with this
flexibility option relates to the fact that energy storage technologies are
still relatively costly.
Flexibility option 3: Transmission flexibility. This flexibility option
allows to balance local mismatches between supply and demand [38].
Since electricity is not always produced and consumed at the same
location, sufficient transmission capacity is needed to transport the
power from generation units to consumers. Accordingly, one major
benefit with this flexibility option is that it is the only option that allows
inter-regional shifting of electricity. Challenges with transmission
flexibility include the relatively high investment costs as well as pos-
sible transmission losses, especially over very long distances; see also
[44].
Flexibility option 4: Demand-side flexibility. This flexibility option
reflects a variety of measures to provide flexibility on the energy de-
mand side [10,18,19]. Among others, DSM, and in particular, its sub-
category of demand response, includes, first, temporal flexibility, i.e.,
rescheduling energy demand, and second, spatial flexibility, e.g., by
enabling spatially distributed, redundant consumers like data centres
[18–20,45]. Hereby, the main benefits are obvious: with a flexible de-
mand-side being able to adopt to intermittent RES generation, con-
sumers may significantly contribute to grid stability [10]. However, a
core challenge of demand-side flexibility is that the demand-side must
be (technically) enabled to increase or decrease its energy consumption
at short notice; see also Section 3.2 for a more detailed discussion of this
flexibility option.
Flexibility option 5: Inter-sectoral flexibility. This flexibility option
relies on an interconnection of different sectors, e.g., gas, heat, and
mobility, with energy generation [46]. Considering power-to-X tech-
nologies as an enabler of such interconnection [47], their main benefit
is to contribute to grid stability similar to options 2 and 4 [48]. How-
ever, an implementation of inter-sectoral flexibility is currently chal-
lengend by high costs for this flexibility option.
Until recently, energy systems have relied mostly on flexibility op-
tions 1 and 3 to balance supply and demand. However, with RES in-
creasingly reducing the profitability of conventional and load-following
power plants by pushing them out of the merit order [49,50], the im-
portance of flexibility option 1 will inevitably decrease in the coming
years. For this reason, in addition to increasing transmission flexibility
(option 3), which currently lacks acceptance among the population in
some countries, it is particularly necessary to develop completely new
flexibility options such as 2, 4, and 5. While the costs of option 2 are
still (prohibitively) high and progress on option 5 is still very slow,
demand-side flexibility appears to be a very promising flexibility option
at present [51]. By developing option 4, as well as the other four
flexibility options, countries will be able to integrate large numbers of
RES and maintain security of supply in future electricity systems. Un-
doubtedly, developing the five different flexibility options supports a
paradigm shift from a world with mainly plannable conventional supply
that follows demand towards a world with mainly intermittent re-
newable supply that must be embedded within different flexibility op-
tions. Despite this change in thinking, the electricity system must still
deliver now on three core issues: (1) reliability; (2) less greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions; and (3) ensure justice in its outcomes (i.e., fairness,
equity, and equality). While reliability has always been a focus of
electricity systems, the Paris COP21 Agreement in 2015 has accelerated
Table 2
Relevance for economic growth and electricity dependency of selected sectors. The considered sectors are in line with the International Standard Industrial
Classification of All Economic Activities of the United Nations [26].
Sector Relevance for economic growth Dependency on electricity
Agriculture, forestry and fishing • Less famine and higher life expectancy • Operation of innovative irrigation systems or cold storage
houses
Manufacturing • Employer and source of value creation • Production processes
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation
activities
• Fewer diseases • Water pumping• Waste shredding
Transportation and storage • Availability of input materials and labor • Electric mobility• Operation of airports, train stations, or car parks
Information and communication • Availability of data and information• Processing of information • Digital services• Operation of news offices
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society’s perspective that increased action on reducing GHG emissions
and ensuring that the development of low-carbon economies happens in
a ‘just’ way is needed [52].
3.2. Industry’s new role in providing flexibility
In shaping future electricity systems, demand-side flexibility may
play a crucial role as highlighted above. Here, the main reasoning is
simple: With supply being increasingly less flexible, the demand side
must somehow increase its flexibility to ensure a balance of demand
and supply at all locations and times [19]; see Table 3 for exemplary
benefits, risks, and challenges associated with (industrial) DSM [10,53].
In most industrialized countries, industry promises the biggest potential
for providing demand-side flexibility. For example, Paulus and Borg-
grefe [18] find that an overall industrial DSM potential of 2.660 MW
will be available in Germany by 2020, which could provide up to 50%
of positive tertiary capacity reserve. Similar potentials can also be
found in other countries. In general, such a flexibility provision implies
that consumers, e.g., industry or households, must reduce their demand
in periods where electricity is scarce, and increase their demand when
flexibility is abundant.
Fig. 3 illustrates a simple ten-period example with three different
demand profiles of a company – depending on how its production
processes are operated. In particular, given constraints relating to the
technical characteristics and the inter-temporal dependencies of a
company’s underlying energy-consuming production processes, by al-
tering its production, the company is able to temporally shift electricity
demand between the ten periods and thus helps to balance the variable
supply from RES. Starting with the original, ex-ante planned electricity-
demand profile in Fig. 3a, the company could increase production in
periods 1, 2, 9, and 10, and reduce its production in periods 4 to 7,
respectively. This would lead to a constant demand profile as illustrated
in Fig. 3b. Similarly, if high electricity supply of RES in periods 8 and 9
is anticipated by the company, it could shift its production to these two
periods according to Fig. 3c. Adopting this temporal shift of electricity
demand, a company may not only contribute to grid balancing, but may
also benefit from financial advantages, e.g., lower electricity prices.
Energy-intensive industrial sectors such as glass, paper, chemicals,
and metals are among the most promising sectors when it comes to
exploiting demand flexibility. Other sectors are at a first glance less
promising, for the simple reason that they do not consume as much
energy as the sectors mentioned before. Nevertheless, as Table 4 illus-
trates, almost every industrial sector has at least some demand-side
flexibility potential and may therefore possibly add value to the system
by supplying its flexibility. For example, the agriculture, forestry and
fishing sector, or the food industry, may use demand flexible cold sto-
rage where the cooling process is managed in such a way that it starts
not at a fixed point in time, but rather within a specified time interval,
depending on the respective supply situation of RES. Moreover, the
transportation and storage sector is able to provide demand flexibility
given the electrification of road traffic that is currently on the rise [54]:
The digitally controlled charging of electric truck fleets, which is geared
to the renewable energy supply and is time-shiftable, offers enormous
potential for balancing demand and supply over time. In addition, also
the information and communication sector may play its part in the
flexibility transition: Spatial load shifting of, for instance, data centers,
may enable the flexibilization of their energy demand [20].
With respect to specific industrial processes that can be flexibilized,
it is typically the supporting processes like cooling or heating that have
the highest flexibility potential. The main reason is that there must not
be any negative effects on the production of the end product, e.g., re-
duced product quality or increased waste, when a company changes its
production pattern to provide flexibility. In addition to thermal sup-
porting processes, flexible main processes might be the graphitization
of graphite electrodes, the paper production from wood chips, or the
melting down of steel crap in blast furnaces. Ultimately, the actual
flexibility potential depends on many different factors – which can, in
turn, not only change from sector to sector, but also from one company
to another within a given sector.
Table 3
Exemplary benefits, risks, and challenges associated with (industrial) DSM.
Sources: [10,53]
Benefits of (industrial) DSM Risks and challenges of (industrial) DSM
• Increased use of RES production with less curtailment• Utlization of synergies with existing production infrastructure• Low emissions during operation including pollutants or noise• Fast response time: industrial loads can be switched off within seconds and react even
faster than, e.g., gas power plants• Decentralized flexibility option
• Increased mechanical wearing and maintenance efforts due to a flexible plant
operation• Complex system with high dependencies within the production process may be
error-prone• Possibly negative effects on underlying production processes, product quality etc.• Information asymmetries and complex opportunity costs may yield severe
economic gaming problems on markets
Fig. 3. Demand flexibility: Demand pattern for a ten-period example with two possible inter-temporal demand shifts.
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4. The flexibility transition as an engine for sustainable and
inclusive industrial development
4.1. Inclusive industrial development: Active participation of industry in
future energy markets
In traditional energy systems, industry merely behaved as a con-
sumer of electricity. As described, this implied that most companies
based their demand for electricity exclusively on their production
processes. Their primary (and sometimes their only) touch point with
electricity markets therefore was electrical energy procurement [51]. In
future energy systems, however, this rather passive role of industry
with respect to electricity market participation must change towards a
much more ‘active’ one. In consequence, companies must no longer
only behave as ‘passive’ energy consumers, but actively participate in
different electricity markets as flexibility suppliers and in this way
contribute to the balancing of variable supply and demand in energy
systems with large shares of RES [58–60].
To activate industry, companies must change their perspective on
electricity as a sole production factor. In particular, electricity must no
longer be only a cost factor, but it must offer the possibility for addi-
tional revenues via an electricity-system stabilizing flexibility supply
[45,61]. Against this background, companies must develop sophisti-
cated business models and DSM strategies. In addition, companies need
to identify, which production processes are actually available for a
flexible operation or may be flexibilized via adequate investments [9].
Along with this, companies must analyze how they can implement
demand-side flexibility both technically and economically [45,51].
For policy-makers it is necessary to provide the appropriate fi-
nancial incentives so that companies actually make their flexibility
available for the system [62]. In this context, for instance, new flex-
ibility and balancing markets - as well as adapted regulatory rules -
need to be created that set as few barriers as possible for companies to
market their flexibility [10,63]. In particular, there is a need to ap-
propriately compensate companies for the costs of supplying a certain
amount of flexibility [9]. Such flexibility costs may result from ex-ante
unplanned shutdowns and subsequent start-up of processes as well as
from unexpected downtimes of machines. If these costs are not appro-
priately compensated for, the technically possible flexibility potential of
the industry may not be activated und remain unused. By activating the
industry and incentivizing the industry to supply their demand flex-
ibility on electricity markets, countries will thus achieve a more in-
clusive industrial development in the sense that the supply side of
flexibility includes new active players.
However, industrial development will not only be inclusive in the
sense that industry will participate more actively in electricity markets,
but especially in the sense that the flexibility transition can generate
significant economic added value and growth from which in turn all
members of society can profit. Such economic value may be provided
through various channels.
First and probably most obvious, industry’s flexibility will help to
ensure a reliable electricity system in the future. Since reliability of
energy supply is the basis for most economic activities, the companies
themselves thus contribute to ensuring that the different sectors of an
economy can continue to produce without harmful supply interruptions
in the future. In addition, also societal needs may be better satisfied
through a reliable energy system, which is for instance obvious with
respect to modern ways of communication.
Second, for many companies, selling their flexibility will be a po-
tential new revenue stream as highlighted above [39,53,58]. When
companies use, for example, their additional earnings to hire new staff,
not only investors and shareholders will benefit, but also the compa-
nies’ employees through the mechanisms described in Section 2. In this
way, the additional economic value gained may ultimately lead to new
economic growth.
Third, further additional value may be created along the whole DSM
value-chain. For instance, supplying demand flexibility, companies
have to invest into sophisticated information and communication
technologies, or, e.g., automation, to adapt their production processes
to an intermittent power generation structure [45]; additionally, em-
ployees need to be trained accordingly to be able to implement the new
DSM strategies. Such a stronger integration of industry into the overall
economy may also lead to a generally increased collaboration along the
value-chain, which in turn could have further positive effects, e.g., on
innovation and value creation [39]. Finally, if countries develop new
DSM technologies and strategies, they may export their knowledge to
other countries – developing countries in particular – that are also
transforming their energy systems. This clearly highlights the high in-
ternational relevance of industrial DSM as a key element of inclusive
industrial development.
4.2. Sustainable industrial development: Low-carbon production and
resource efficiency in future economies
As described in Section 3, industrial demand-side flexibility may be
a key element for balancing intermittent supply and demand in energy
systems with a large share of RES. If future industrial demand is suffi-
ciently flexibilized, consumers – including industry itself – can be
supplied with green energy from low-carbon RES. Thus, the industry
can power its production processes with renewable energy and there-
fore lower its carbon footprint significantly [64,65]. In contrast, today
large amounts of renewably produced electricity have to be down-
regulated in order to avoid overloading of transmission lines. More
specifically, the responsible grid operator may temporarily suspend the
feed-in from RES if the grid capacities are not sufficient to transport the
total electricity generated. Being an example for many other countries,
in Germany alone, the corresponding feed-in management (“Einspei-
semanagement”) involved volumes of 5.403 GWh and monetary com-
pensation payments of 635,4 million Euro in 2018 [66]. What makes
such downregulations even worse is the fact that conventional power
plants are often switched on instead, which then emit additional and
unnecessary GHG.
Table 4
Exemplary flexibility potential of selected sectors. The considered sectors are in line with the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic
Activities of the United Nations [26].
Sector Flexibility potential
Agriculture, forestry and fishing [55] • Demand-driven biogas production• Demand-side flexibility of cold storage houses
Manufacturing [25] • Flexible production processes• Smart factories
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities [9] • Demand-side flexibility of waste processing plants
Transportation and storage [56] • Vehicle-to-grid technologies• Smart mobility• Intelligent operation of cold storage houses
Information and communication [20,57] • Spatial flexibility of data centers
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In addition, by incentivizing the industry to supply its flexibility,
countries exploit inherent technical flexibility potentials and thereby
save large financial and natural resources (including for instance land
or raw materials) that would have to be used to install completely new
flexibility options [53]. For example, instead of having to build new
gas-fired power plants (flexibility option 1) or instead of extending the
electricity grid to a much larger extent (flexibility option 3), in-
dustrialized countries could draw on the industrial DSM potential that
already exists in many production systems; the use of already inherent
flexibility in the industry may therefore generally support the transition
towards low-carbon economies [67]. With respect to developing
countries that are currently in the process of industrialization, they
could design their energy and industrial policies in a way such that the
ability to supply flexibility is already considered during the planning
and construction of new factories without additional and costly ex-post
investments.
Furthermore, industrial DSM is typically more efficient than many
other flexibility options like power to gas technologies (flexibility op-
tion 5), as it does not require the conversion of energy, but rather shifts
the timing of a specific production process [60]. Companies that supply
their flexibility could in this way also contribute to a reduction in
overall investments in RES capacities that would be necessary to ac-
count for the described conversion inefficiencies. In this way, an overall
reduction of the costs of future energy provision may be the result [39].
Finally, by providing flexibility, companies are able to develop and
deepen their internal knowledge about electricity systems in general
[39]. In turn, this could put companies into a better position when it
comes to the implementation of other energy-related measures, e.g.,
energy efficiency measures. Thus, energy flexibility may serve as a
catalyst for other attempts towards a reduction of GHG emissions. To
sum up, as industrial demand-side flexibility may enable the reliable
supply of green energy, the flexibility transition may not only lead to
more inclusive but also to more sustainable industrial development.
4.3. The just transition to a low-carbon economy
So far, we have seen that the different electricity-consuming in-
dustrial sectors must take on an active flexibility role to help mitigate
climate change by fostering an inclusive and sustainable energy system
transformation as well as industrial development. While many agree
that climate change is among the world’s central issues [68], the spe-
cific solutions to climate change are often discussed either from a socio-
technical or from an ethical perspective - integrated solutions are rarely
proposed [69,70]. However, a large transition such as the flexibility
transition will inevitably bring with it benefits and disbenefits that have
to be discussed with all the relevant stakeholders. As we will also see
below, an overall solution can only be determined in a corresponding
stakeholder dialogue that brings the different hopes and fears together,
rather than ignoring them.
Whether it is possible to actively involve industry in a successful
flexibility transition and in balancing markets obviously depends not
only on purely economic or technical details, but especially on whether
the benefits and disbenefits of the flexibility transition are distributed
through a fair and equitable process among all members of society.
Moving towards a low-carbon society, this idea forms the basis of the
concept of the ‘just transition’ [23,52]. It seeks to promote justice by
developing “principles, tools and agreements that ensure both a fair and
equitable transition for all individuals and communities” [23]. Prime
examples of energy problems for which such a consideration appears
important for ethical reasons include involuntary resettlement due to
energy projects, fossil fuel pollution by power plants, or the disposal of
nuclear waste [69].
As the example of the German EEG levy illustrates, a single energy
problem can give rise to several different ethical concerns [53].
Through the EEG, the producers of electricity from RES receive a fixed
remuneration for every kWh they feed into the grid. This remuneration
is financed by the EEG levy, which final consumers in Germany con-
tribute to and which is part of the electricity price. The state subsidy for
RES is thus financed jointly by all citizens – which can be seen as the
partial implementation of distributional justice. At the same time, how-
ever, the German industry was able to secure considerable exemptions
from the EEG levy by expressing concerns about maintaining its inter-
national competitiveness [71]. Thus, the costs of the new green energy
supply are predominantly borne by regular households, while the in-
dustry profits from it with a low level of (financial) participation –
which is a partial violation of the principle of distributional justice [53].
This example demonstrates that it is therefore not only important to
financially incentivize the industry to supply its demand-side flexibility,
but also to bear in mind the non-industry stakeholders when it comes to
allocating both the costs and benefits of the industrial flexibility tran-
sition. In contrast to a unilateral financing through non-industry sta-
keholders, active participation and acceptance also requires an active,
inclusive, and ‘tangible’ involvement in the distribution of benefits as
well as confronting risk preceptions of the public. Even though the
overall monetary burden of the industry should clearly be reasonable in
order to avoid international competitive disadvantages due to prohi-
bitively high energy costs, inclusiveness must imply that transformation
costs are not passed on to the non-industry stakeholders with some kind
of industry excuse accepted by the government. It is here that the dis-
cussion on energy justice is relevant. In achieving justice, a government
will have to ensure that different stakeholders engage to make sure that
the electricity sector itself and the wider economy deliver just economic
outcomes.
In different countries, governments themselves are looking already
to take the first steps towards action here. A recent development that
encapsulates a new movement by government is the development of a
Just Transition Commission (JTC). The aim of this JTC is to ensure for
everyone in society that there is a just transition to a low-carbon
economy. The development of a JTC is the first legislative step to
achieve it; and there are currently nine forms of such an emerging
commission in the following jurisdictions: Australia, Canada, the EU,
Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland, South Africa, and the US.
Such a commission will have different functions from country to
country but in essence and at the very least it will provide expert advice
on the ways to achieve a just transition and also will monitor the effects
of existing laws and policies to ensure they contribute to the delivery of
a just transition.
In legal terms these JTCs would be a form of a new public admin-
istrative unit (i.e., attached to a ministerial department such as energy,
labor, etc. or spanning a few departments). Overall, however, the aim of
a JTC is to accelerate the societal shift to a just transition to a low-
carbon economy. Such a development is designed to address also so-
cietal inequality, clean energy development, and climate action. Some
countries are even considering the establishment of a Just Transition
Fund which would support financially more acute needs, for example of
a selected industry, to transform itself.
Early research into JTCs indicates that countries are going for a
number of options but there are two emerging solutions which can be
identified as an external JTC and an internal JTC. An external JTC is
now in evidence in Germany (2018) and in Scotland (2019) and this is
where the majority of the membership of the JTC consists of external
appointments – i.e., they represent different stakeholders in society in
terms of the development of the just transition to a low-carbon
economy. The internal JTC (New Zealand – 2019) in contrast consists of
civil servants who then engage with stakeholders.
While the issue of the powers of a JTC remains undefined, there is
research needed into exploring which type of JTC, the internal or ex-
ternally oriented one, will have more power. As of yet, the powers of
the JTC are slowly beginning to emerge and this is in essence an in-
ternational ‘live’ research issue. Indications are that this is an area that
governments are approaching with caution, as it is politically sensitive
and also requires cooperation from multiple government ministries.
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However, if there is success, a JTC could have a transformative effect in
the development of low-carbon economies worldwide.
Alongside other scholars worldwide we hope to answer the ques-
tions highlighted above as these issues continue to develop in future
research. However, we aim in the next section to propose a method of
practically identifying a solution to flexibility problems in terms of
flexibility use by industry. Against this background, we are among the
first to advance a practical application of how industry can improve its
performance in meeting energy and climate goals that would see a just
transition to a low-carbon economy. As various governments are be-
ginning to introduce new policy in this area, resolving flexibility chal-
lenges in the electricity system would therefore have important inter-
national real-world research application.
5. A four-step monitoring approach for the industrial flexibility
transition
With an ambitious project such as the flexibility transition, there is
always a risk that the set goals on the path towards a more energy-
flexible industry will be delayed or not achieved at all. One of the most
prominent examples for this phenomenon is probably the community of
states’ effort to reduce GHG emissions under the Paris COP21
Agreement in 2015. Currently, only six members (China, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Russia, and Turkey) of the G20 are on track to
achieving their nationally determined contributions to this goal – with
Argentina and the EU28 requiring low, Australia, Canada, South Africa,
the Republic of Korea, and the United States requiring high additional
effort [72].
One reason why the enthusiasm and commitment for self-imposed
policy measures and goals typically fade quickly is the complexity of
the projects to be tackled. Complexity can come from various sources.
For example, the more sectors of an economy and the more societal
domains are affected by a project such as, e.g., the reduction of GHG
emissions, the more difficult it is for policy-makers to keep track and
predict the diverse consequences of their decisions and policies. In
addition, if the various stakeholders pursue different goals and each
wants to benefit as much as possible from a specific policy, the com-
plexity of the overall system increases even more. As a consequence of
this complexity, the measures and goals that were initially set by pol-
icymakers may not be appropriate anymore or be simply not achievable
at a later point in time.
Practically implementing the industrial flexibility transition in a
way that everyone can benefit from it and no one is left behind requires
the joint effort of all stakeholders as well as appropriate policies and
clearly defined goals. In particular, the process of making the industry
more flexible will necessitate numerous policy measures which touch
not only on the realm of energy and industrial policy – but also on that
of, e.g., environmental and social policy. In concrete terms, this often
means for countries all around the world that several political groups
across several different ministries would have to work together to co-
ordinate these policies. This increases the coordination effort on the
political side, which must be taken into account when planning and
implementing a project such as the flexibility transition, both, com-
plexity and coordination effort are increased by the peculiarities of the
electricity sector itself. In particular, electricity markets are generally
highly regulated, and regulation has traditionally been geared towards
flexibility provision of conventional power plants. However, existing
regulation makes access to electricity markets considerably hard or
even impossible for the new flexibility options described in Section 3.
As a consequence, when regulatory authorities try to adapt the reg-
ulatory system accordingly, they must not only take into account the
goals that they want to achieve with this specific matter (i.e., simplify
the industrial flexibility provision), but also how new rules affect the
existing regulatory system with its complex interaction of markets,
regulated monopolies, technologies, and the various stakeholders.
As has been described, updating and establishing the policy and
regulatory framework such that it enables industrial flexibility is a
‘Herculean’ task – especially in a complex policy area such as elec-
tricity, with the many side-effects on other policy areas beyond the
energy and climate change boundary. While respective policy in-
itiatives have faced severe challenges in the last decades, we propose a
holistic and transparent approach (i.e., a continuous monitoring) to
ensure that an industrial flexibility transition is to be achieved. Against
this background, we develop a first monitoring approach that may
ensure that the flexibility transition is and keeps on track by appro-
priately monitoring the status quo and the progress made on the path
towards a more energy-flexible industry, as well as by regularly invol-
ving every relevant stakeholder. Our approach can be applied in both
developed and developing countries.
In particular, in this section we present a general four-step mon-
itoring that will allow to continuously measure the progress made on
the flexibility transition pathway as highlighted in Fig. 4. This approach
may either assist the JTC in its work or even be an integral part of it. In
the first step of this approach, we use a composite index to capture the
flexibility targets as well as to set appropriate and measurable policy
goals. The second step is there to track how this index develops over
time and to introduce first ‘triggers’ that may indicate when something
goes wrong with respect to the implemented policies and the targeted
goal achievement. In the third step, we propose a stakeholder dialogue
to make sure that everyone can actively take part in the process of
rethinking and reshaping currently misdesigned policy that hinders the
supply of flexibility in the just transition. Here, directly concepts of
energy justice that for instance relate to an active involvement of the
different stakeholders as well as the consideration of their risk per-
ceptions are important. Finally, the last step implements counter-
measures based on the previous stakeholder dialogue whenever the
Fig. 4. Four-step monitoring approach for the flexibility transition. Monitoring consists of (1) the definition of policy goals based on a flexibility index, (2) the
measurement of the actual state and progress, (3) a stakeholder dialogue, and (4) the implementation of needed countermeasures.
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index signals that policy is not on track.
• Step 1: Definition of policy goals
Fighting globally against climate change, national actions and cor-
responding policy goals towards the flexibility transition should always
be aligned with the overarching Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
and other international climate agreements. Similar to the SDGs
themselves, concrete targets must be set to commit industry and all
other relevant stakeholders. Here, composite indices are a well-known
concept that is commonly applied in many policy areas and also by
organizations like the UN or the OECD; see [73]. On the one hand,
composite indices allow targets to be set, either in the form of concrete
target values, minimum targets, or target corridors. On the other hand,
indices offer the possibility of informing the parties involved about both
the actual status and the target situation (see also Step 2). As can be
seen in Table 5, there are different possible targets that may be set by
policy-makers with respect to the flexibility transition.
Table 6 exemplarily highlights which of the overarching SDGs 7
(Affordable and Clean Energy) and 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infra-
structure) targets could be positively influenced by reaching the in-
dustry flexibility targets above.
• Step 2: Measurement of actual state and progress
A continuous ‘success’ measurement builds on the comparison of the
determined target index target value of Step 1 with the currently rea-
lized index value t( ) in a period t. There are several triggers that may
indicate that the index develops in a somehow ‘wrong’ direction; see
also [74]. A natural lower limit for such a trigger may be the ex-ante
index value 0; see Fig. 5(i). An early warning may also be triggered if
the index value t( ) at time t is less than the index value t( 1) at
time t-1; see Fig. 5(ii). The latter case indicates a slowdown in the policy
progress. Another trigger may monitor whether the policy is making a
steady and targeted progress in the area of flexibility supply: If the
index falls below a certain benchmark, this may also indicate a general
slowdown in policy progress; see Fig. 5(iii).
• Step 3: Carrying out a stakeholder dialogue
If a corresponding comparison of the actual and target index value
indicates that targets are missed, reasons for the mis-development must
be found out by involving the relevant stakeholders (stakeholder dia-
logue). In this way, current barriers to a further flexibility supply are
discussed and uncovered. In addition, adjustments to the existing policy
framework may be jointly decided on. This may include the replace-
ment of outdated regulations that currently hamper an appropriate
flexibility supply of the industry. Concrete examples of such complex
regulations that may have to be updated in the course of the flexibility
transition may be the present ‘sanctioning’ of flexibility via grid
charges, e.g., in Germany, and the (statutory) conflict of objectives
between energy flexibility and energy efficiency. Obviously, in this
context issues from energy justice play a crucial role. In particular,
society should not have to undergo a major rise in activism [75] and
climate strikes [76]. Instead, more collaborative work needs to be
completed [52].
• Step 4: Implementation of countermeasures
The previous steps of the proposed monitoring approach allow for
detecting possible policy challenges via early warnings and associated
triggers. Therefore, a country has a range of signals for a stakeholder
dialogue and for the introduction of updated policy and law instru-
ments. These new regulations may regularly be brought into the leg-
islative process by the government so that a country remains on course
to deliver a just transition to a low-carbon economy with an efficient
functioning and inclusive industry sector.
6. Conclusions
Tackling the devastating effects of climate change that can already
be felt in many countries is a worldwide problem and recent global
cooperation is on the rise in the last few years, notably via the Paris
COP21 Agreement in 2015. National energy transitions across the
world are associated with an increased need of new flexibility options
to ensure energy and climate goals are realized via the development
and efficient utilization of RES. Our paper focusses on industrial de-
mand-side flexibility that is considered to hold unique potential. In this
Table 5
Possible targets for the industrial flexibility transition. The different criteria
may be used in a corresponding flexibility index.
Possible industrial flexibility transition targets
• Extend industrial demand flexibility to x MW.• Increase investments in new demand flexibility to x Euro.• Introduce necessary flexibility markets and trading products.• Install necessary sensors and meters in the electricity system.• Increase the number of flexible consumers in rather inflexible regions.• Ensure an appropriate spatial distribution of flexibility.• Increase the absolute number of companies that provide flexibility.• Increase the number of new industrial projects where future flexibility already plays
a role in planning.• Support innovation and enhance scientific research with respect to industrial DSM.• Increase access to information and communications technology that allow for
demand-side flexibility.
Table 6
Selected targets of SDGs 7 and 9 that industrial demand-side flexibility directly contributes to achieving.
Sustainable Development Goal Target
Goal 7: Affordable and Clean Energy 7.1 By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services.
7.2 By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix.
7.B By 2030, expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services for all in
developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing States, and land-locked developing
countries, in accordance with their respective programs of support.
Goal 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure 9.1 Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and transborder infrastructure, to
support economic development and human well-being, with a focus on affordable and equitable access to all.
9.2 Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and, by 2030, significantly raise industry’s share of employment and
gross domestic product, in line with national circumstances, and double its share in least developed countries.
9.4 By 2030, upgrade infrastructure and retrofit industries to make them sustainable, with increased resource-use efficiency
and greater adoption of clean and environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes, with all countries taking
action in accordance with their respective capabilities.
9.A Facilitate sustainable and resilient infrastructure development in developing countries through enhanced financial,
technological and technical support to African countries, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries, and
small island developing States.
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context, flexibility refers to the ability to balance demand and inter-
mittent supply that increasingly comes from RES. Inherently, the latter
are influenced by uncertain weather conditions that determine their
actual production volumes. As this paper advances, a corresponding
flexibility transition has the unique potential of fostering sustainable
industrialization and growth, that – given the influence of industry over
the rest of the economy – can be transformational as nations all over the
world aim to ensure a just transition to a low-carbon economy.
However, no industry sector must be excluded both in terms of the
exploitation of its flexibility potential and in terms of the distribution of
the future benefits of a successful energy system transformation.
Therefore, a sustainable and inclusive flexibility transition is needed as
an engine for further industrialization and growth. While many policy
initiatives faced severe challenges in the past, we propose a holistic and
transparent approach (i.e., a continuous monitoring) to ensure that this
global and important goal is to be achieved. In particular, to ensure that
the flexibility transition is and keeps on track, we develop a first
monitoring approach that builds on a composite flexibility index that is
embedded within a four-step approach. These four steps proposed here
are: (1) utilizing a composite index to capture the flexibility supply by
the industry and then setting measurable policy goals; (2) track how
this index develops over time with ‘triggers’ indicating when policy
reform is needed; (3) an (industry) stakeholder dialogue process begins
to rethink and reshape new reform to increase the supply of flexibility
in the just transition; and (4) implementation of countermeasures based
on the previous industry stakeholder dialogue whenever the index
signals that policy is not on track. We underline that such a flexibility
index may support the concept of flexibility justice by increasing
transparency in the energy system.
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